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Abstract
We consider an asymmetric contest in which policy-motivated players make proposals with
both a spatial location and a “quality” component, which must be generated at an up-front
cost. Potential applications include elections, legislative policymaking, lobbying, expertise
acquisition in bureaucracies, and judicial opinion writing. We show that equilibria are es-
sentially unique and in two-dimensional mixed strategies, and provide an elegant analytical
characterization of strategies, outcomes, and payoffs that yields many results. In equilibrium,
more extreme proposals are both higher quality and strictly better for the decisionmaker.
A more ideologically extreme or able player is more likely to make a proposal, and makes
more extreme proposals, but is also more likely to win due to their proposals’ substantially
higher quality. Simultaneously, her opponent is harmed and moderates her own proposals.
When the players are highly asymmetric one almost always wins, but the decisionmaker may
nevertheless strongly benefit from the potential for competition.
1 Introduction
In many political environments, ideologically-motivated actors try to increase the appeal of
their policy proposals by working to increase their appeal along non-ideological dimensions.
For example, within legislatures, lawmakers as well as interest group lobbies invest effort
drafting detailed legislative text for bills that not only further their ideological aims, but
are also well designed; e.g., clearly written, cost-efficient, and with predictable consequences
(Hirsch and Shotts (2012); Hitt, Volden and Wiseman (2017)). Within the executive branch,
competing bureaucrats exercise “informal authority” by strategically investing in expertise
at implementing specific policies and not others, in order to incentivize their political supe-
riors to choose those policies (Ting (2011); Turner (2017)). And on multi-member courts,
competing justices expend considerable effort to craft judicial opinions supporting their ide-
ological positions that are also clear, persuasive, and implementable by lower courts in order
to gain their colleagues’ votes (Lax and Cameron (2007)).
In this paper, we develop a simple model to understand the implications of this common
strategic dynamic for political competition, policy development, and policy outcomes. In
the model, two policy-motivated actors simultaneously make proposals consisting of both
an ideological “spatial” dimension over which they disagree, and a common value “quality”
dimension that must be produced at an up-front cost. A decisionmaker with preferences over
both ideology and quality then selects one of the two proposals (or another alternative from
a set of exogenous outside options), and the game ends. The decisionmaker cannot commit
ex-ante to which proposal she will choose as a function of the strategies, nor can she go back
to the proposers and request additional investments or alternative policies. The model is
thus particularly well-suited suited to political decisionmaking, although it may be applied
to any organizational setting that shares the above properties.
While the model is exceedingly simple to formulate, it nevertheless has several interesting
properties. First, the resulting “contest” has an “all pay” component (Siegel (2009)) –
players decide how much effort to exert before knowing what their opponent has proposed.
Consequently, equilibria are in mixed strategies. Second, it is multidimensional – players gain
support for their proposals through a mixture of ideological concessions and up-front quality
investments, with more of one reducing the need for the other. Third, it is asymmetric –
players may differ both in their ability at generating quality, and in their intrinsic ideological
extremism. (Unlike the standard all-pay contest, differences in costs and “valuations” are
not isomorphic.)
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Fourth, the players are purely policy-motivated – they care only about the ideology and
quality of the chosen proposal, rather than whose proposal is chosen. This creates two addi-
tional complexities in the contest structure. First, ideological concessions are “winner pay,”
in that the cost of making a concession is only suffered if the proposal actually wins (Che and
Gale (2003)). Second and more importantly, there is a “second order rank order spillover”
(Baye, Kovenock and Vries (2012); Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2010)); the strategy of the
(first ranked) winner has a direct effect on the utility of the (second ranked) loser, because
she must live under the winner’s policy.
We first show that equilibrium strategies are characterized by univariate atomless proba-
bility distributions over the decisionmaker’s utility with common convex support, combined
with simple functions associating each utility with a unique combination of ideology and
quality. The distributions are characterized by an intuitive coupled system of differential
equations. While the basic form of the conditions is unsurprising, the proofs are complicated
by the second-order spillover, which rules out the use of techniques that exploit exogenously
fixed payoffs from losing (Siegel (2009)).
We next derive a unique analytical solution to the system of differential equations, thereby
fully characterizing equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the general asymmetric case. This
yields a variety of substantive results and comparative statics, a subset of which we highlight.
First, participation in the contest is generically asymmetric; one proposer always makes a
positive-quality proposal, while the other sits out with strictly positive probability. Second,
more ideologically extreme proposals in the support of a player’s strategy are both higher
quality and strictly better for the decisionmaker. The reason is that ideological concessions
are effectively “winner pay,” and therefore more expensive to make on proposals that are
more likely to win. (See also Hirsch and Shotts (2015)). An additional implication is that
competition fails to generate “convergence” to the decisionmaker’s ideal policy in a strong
sense – the decisionmaker is always presented with, and always chooses, a proposal whose
ideology differs from his own. This property emerges naturally from the proposers’ attempts
to exploit quality investments to gain support for ideological outcomes they prefer, and
occurs even though contest outcomes are deterministic (see Munster (2006)).
Third, more able or extreme proposers dominate the contest and are more likely to win
by virtue of their greater motivation and ability. Thus, extreme preferences – far from a
liability – are an asset in the contest because they produce a greater willingness to invest in
quality to realize ideological gains.
Fourth, a proposer becoming more extreme or more able benefits the DM – both a greater
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willingness or ability to invest in quality are sufficiently channeled into productive invest-
ments that the DM benefits in expectation. This is true even though unilaterally greater
extremism or ability by one proposer also causes that proposer to make more ideologically
extreme proposals, which harms her competitor and also induces the competitor to moderate.
Lastly and in contrast to the standard two-player all pay contest, asymmetries between
the proposers may actually benefit the DM if they result from one proposers’ greater extrem-
ism or ability. We show that if the proposers begin with symmetric extremism and costs,
and this symmetry is broken by one proposer becoming more extreme or able, then the DM
is made unambiguously better off. This is true even though the weaker proposer becomes
less likely to participate in the contest. Moreover, in the limiting case of one proposer be-
coming arbitrarily extreme or able, the probability her competitor participates approaches 0
– the stronger player thus has the appearance of being a monopoly agenda setter. But, the
DM’s utility is bounded away from what it would be in a true monopoly (Hirsch and Shotts
(2017)). In fact, if one proposer becomes arbitrarily extreme, the decisionmaker becomes
unboundedly better off.
1.1 Related Literature
The model is a direct generalization of Hirsch and Shotts (2015), extending that symmetric
model to consider arbitrary asymmetries in both the proposers’ preferences and abilities.
Other minor differences are that this paper allows for different potential outside options for
the decisionmaker (including no outside option, as in a two-candidate election), and also
varying weights on quality vs. ideology. These papers in turn relate to several literatures.
The first is a growing literature in political science that analyzes political decisionmaking
when experts can make costly investments to endow specific policy proposals with “qual-
ity” that is valued by all players. One microfoundation for quality is a reduction in the
variance of spatial policy outcomes when ideological players are risk-averse. This concep-
tualization of expertise generates very different strategic incentives than models built on
Crawford and Sobel (1982), where experts acquire knowledge of an unknown state of the
word that uniformly shifts all players’ ideal policies (See Hirsch and Shotts (2012)). In models
with policy-specific quality, experts “attempt to exploit their monopoly power over invest-
ments to compel decision makers to accept policies that promote their interests” (Hirsch and
Shotts (2015)), an effect that is akin to “real authority” in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and
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expertise in “complex” environments in Callander (2008).1 Such models have been used to
analyze decisionmaking in a variety of institutional settings, including interbranch bargain-
ing (Londregan (2000)), bureaucratic expertise (Ting (2011); Turner (2017)), lobbying and
influence (Hirsch and Shotts (2017)), policymaking in legislatures (Hitt, Volden and Wise-
man (2017)), and judicial opinion writing (Lax and Cameron (2007)). Like us, the latter
two works consider competition (the former briefly), but assume that the proposers move in
a previously-determined sequence.
The second is a large literature spanning across political science and economics analyzing
applied models of two-player contests in which strategies have both an “all pay” and “spatial”
component (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009); Epstein and Nitzan (2004); Herrera,
Levine and Martinelli (2008); Munster (2006); Serra (2010); Wiseman (2006); Zakharov
(2009)).2 With few exceptions (Konrad (2000)) such models have been used to study electoral
contests or lobbying contests. The models are diverse in their assumptions, differing in terms
of their sequencing (e.g. spatial component first and all-pay component second, all-pay first
and spatial second, or one proposer first and the other second), the proposers’ motivations
(winning, policy-motivated, a mixture), and the proposers’ knowledge of the decisionmaker’s
preferences (modelled abstractly with a contest success function (CSF), modelled explicitly
with uncertainty, or deterministic and known). Our model has two key differences with this
collection of works. First, the all pay component is a common value investment in quality,
and therefore intrinsically valued by the proposers as well as the decisionmaker. Second, all
choices – both spatial and all pay, and by both proposers– are made simultaneously.
The third is the broader literature on contests with an all-pay component, studied in a
wide variety of permutations. The standard contest with complete information and asymmet-
ric valuations and costs is fully examined by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock
and de Vries (1996). Political applications include Baye, Kovenock and Vries (1993) (who
study a decisionmaker that can restrict participation), Che and Gale (1998) (who augment
the model with spending caps), and Meirowitz (2008) (who studies both spending caps and
“head starts”). Our model differs from the standard contest in a variety of other ways.
The simultaneous choice of policy and quality generates a multidimensional contest with an
1Callander (2008) specifically models an unknown state of the world known only to an expert as the
realized path of a Brownian motion mapping policies to outcomes; policy-specific quality may be thought of
as the limiting case in which the variance tends to infinity.
2Spatial contests defined as such are also connected to n ≥ 3 player contests with identity-dependent
externalities, which could result from participants with spatial preferences who are constrained to propose
their own ideal points (see Esteban and Ray (1999); Linster (1993), and Klose and Kovenock (2015)).
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all-pay component, similar to the multidimensional contest studied by Che and Gale (2003)
in which firms choose the quality and price of an innovation (see also Siegel (2009)). In addi-
tion, the policy-motivation of the proposers generates a rank order spillover, as analyzed by
Baye, Kovenock and Vries (2012) in deterministic contests and Chowdhury and Sheremeta
(2010) with a CSF (both in symmetric contests). To our knowledge, ours is the first model to
combine asymmetries and rank order spillovers, rank order spillovers and multidimensional
strategies, or the three properties together.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 develops con-
cepts and notation, and presents some general results. Section 4 uses an intermediate result
to analytically characterize the likelihood each player makes a proposal, the probabilities
of victory, the conditions under which there is a dominant player, and the equilibrium dis-
tributions over ideologies. Section 5 fully characterizes equilibrium strategies analytically,
and uses this to derive payoffs and related results. Section 6 concludes. Proofs that are
straightforward or yield important intuition are in the main text; the remainder are in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
Two proposers (Left and Right) make competing proposals for consideration by a decision-
maker (DM). A proposal (γ, q) consists of a unidimensional ideology γ ∈ R and a level of
quality q ∈ [0,∞) = R+; quality must be produced at an up-front cost. All three players care
only about the characteristics of the proposal ultimately chosen, rather than whose proposal
is chosen. Utility over proposals takes the form
Ui (γ, q) =
(
1
λ
)
q − (γ −Xi)2 ,
where Xi is player i
′s ideological ideal point, and 1
λ
is the weight all players place on quality.
The proposers’ ideal points are on either side of the decisionmaker (XL < XD < XR).
The game proceeds as follows. First, the proposers simultaneously choose proposals
(γi, qi). Making a proposal with quality qi costs ci (qi) = aiqi up-front, where ai >
1
λ
.
Second, the DM chooses one of the two proposals or something else from an exogenous set of
outside options O, where O may contain the DM’s ideal point with no quality (0, 0) and/or
proposals that are strictly worse (and can be empty).
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3 Preliminary Analysis
The game is a multidimensional contest (Che and Gale (2003)) in which the scoring rule
applied to “bids” (γ, q) is just the DM’s utility UD (γ, q) =
(
1
λ
)
q − (XD − γ)2 . To facilitate
the analysis we thus reparameterize proposals (γ, q) to be expressed in terms of (s, y), where
y = γ − XD is the (signed) distance of a proposal’s ideology from the DM’s ideal, and
s =
(
1
λ
)
q − y2 is the DM’s utility for a proposal, or its score. The implied quality of a
proposal (s, y) is then q = λ (s+ y2). Using this we re-express the proposers’ utility and
cost functions in terms of (s, y). Note that the decisionmaker’s ideal point with 0-quality
has exactly 0 score, and is the most competitive “free” proposal to make.
Definition 1.
1. Player i’s utility for proposal (s, y) is
Vi (s, y) = Ui
(
y +XD, λ
(
s+ y2
))
= −x2i + s+ 2xiy
where xi = Xi −XD is the (signed) distance of i’s ideal from the DM.
2. Proposer i’s cost to make proposal (s, y) is
ci(λ
(
s+ y2
)
) = ai · λ
(
s+ y2
)
= αi
(
s+ y2
)
where αi = aiλ is i’s weighted marginal cost of generating quality.
Figure 1 depicts the game in ideology-quality space. The DM’s indifference curves, i.e.,
the proposals with equal score, are depicted by green lines. Definition 1 reparameterizes
proposals into score and ideological distance (henceforth just ideology) (s, y), and the five
primitives (Xi, ai, λ) into four parameters (xi, αi) describing the proposers’ ideal ideological
distance from the DM xi = Xi−XD (henceforth just ideal ideology) and weighted marginal
costs of generating quality αi = aiλ (henceforth just costs).
3.1 Necessary and Sufficient Equilibrium Conditions
In the reparameterized game, a proposer’s pure strategy (si, yi) is a two-dimensional element
of B ≡{(s, y) ∈ R2 | s+ y2 ≥ 0}. A mixed strategy σi is a probability measure over the Borel
subsets of B, and let Fi (s) denote the CDF over scores induced by i’s mixed strategy σi.3
3For technical convenience we restrict attention to strategies generating score CDFs that can be written
as the sum of an absolutely continuous and a discrete distribution.
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Figure 1: Setup of the Policy Contest
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We now derive necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions in a series of four lemmas.
Let Π¯i (si, yi;σ−i) denote i’s expected utility for making proposal (si, yi) with si ≥ 0 if a tie
would be broken in her favor. Clearly this is i’s expected utility from making a proposal
at any si > 0 where −i has no atom, and i can always achieve utility arbitrarily close to
Π¯i (si, yi;σ−i) by making ε−higher score proposals. Now Π¯i (si, yi;σ−i) =
− αi
(
si + y
2
i
)
+ F−i (si) · Vi (si, yi) +
∫
s−i>si
Vi (s−i, y−i) dσ−i. (1)
The first term is the up-front cost of generating the proposal’s quality. The second term is
the probability i’s proposal is selected, times her utility for it. The third term is i’s utility
should she lose, which requires integrating over all her opponent’s proposals with higher
score than si. Taking the derivative with respect to yi yields the first Lemma.
Lemma 1. At any score si > 0 where F−i (·) has no atom, the proposal (si, y∗i (si)), where
y∗i (si) = F−i (si) · xiαi , is the strictly best score-si proposal.
Proof: Straightforward. QED
Lemma 1 states that at almost every score si > 0, proposer i’s unique best combination
of ideology and quality to generate that score is just a weighted average of the proposer’s and
DM’s ideal ideologies xi
αi
, multiplied by the probability F−i (si) that i’s opponent makes a
lower-score proposal. Note that i′s optimal ideology does not depend directly on her opponent
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−i’s ideologies, since a proposal’s ideology (holding score fixed) only matters conditional on
winning. The optimal ideology also depends on the exact score si only indirectly through
probability F−i(si) the proposal wins the contest, since i’s utility conditional on winning is
additively separable in score and ideology.
The second lemma establishes that at least one of the proposers is always active, in
the sense of making a proposal with strictly positive score (all positive-score proposals are
positive-quality, but the reverse is not necessarily true). Intuitively, this holds because the
proposers wish to move policy in opposite directions from the DM, and can beat negative-
score proposals for “free” by proposing the DM’s ideal with 0-quality.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium Fk (0) > 0 for at most one k ∈ {L,R}.
Proof: Suppose not, so Fi (0) > 0 ∀i in some equilibrium. Let U∗i denote proposer i’s
equilibrium utility, which can be achieved by mixing according to her strategy conditional
on making score-s ≤ 0 proposal. Let y¯0 denote the expected ideological outcome and s¯0
the expected score outcome conditional on both sides making score ≤ 0 proposals. Since
xL < 0 < xR, we have Vk (s¯
0, y¯0) ≤ Vk (0, 0) for at least one k, which implies k has a profitable
deviation since U∗k ≤ Π¯k (0, 0;σ−k) < Π¯k (0, y∗k (0) ;σ−k) (since F−k (0) > 0). QED
The third Lemma establishes that in equilibrium there is 0 probability of a tie at a strictly
positive score. The absence of score ties is an intuitive consequence of exactly opposing
ideological interests and the fact that generating quality is “all pay” – at least one proposer
will find it in her interests to invest up-front in a bit more quality to break the tie, and make
an ideological proposal that is weakly better than the expected outcome from a tie.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium there is 0-probability of a tie at scores s > 0.
Proof: Suppose not, so each proposer’s strategy generates an atom of size psi > 0 at some
s > 0. Proposer i achieves her equilibrium utility U∗i by mixing according to her strategy
conditional on a score-s proposal. Let y¯s denote the expected ideological outcome conditional
on both sides making score-s proposals; then Vk (s, y¯
s) ≤ Vk (s, 0) for at least one k, who
has a profitable deviation. If k’s proposal at score s is (s, 0), then U∗k ≤ Π¯k (s, 0;σ−k) <
Π¯k (s, y
∗
k (s) ;σ−k) (since F−k (s) > 0). If k sometimes proposes something else, then U
∗
k <(
1− p−k
F−k(s)
)
Π¯k (s, E [yk|s] ;σ−k) +
(
p−k
F−k(s)
)
Π¯k (s, 0;σ−k), which is k’s utility if she were to
instead propose (s, 0) with probability p−k
F−k(s)
, and the expected ideology E [yk|s] of her
strategy at score s with the remaining probability (and always win ties). QED
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Lemmas 1 – 3 jointly imply that in equilibrium, proposer i can compute her expected utility
as if her opponent only makes proposals of the form
(
s−i, y∗−i (s−i)
)
. The utility from making
any proposal (si, yi) with si > 0 where −i has no atom (or a tie would be broken in i’s favor)
is therefore Π¯∗i (si, yi;F ) =
− αi
(
si + y
2
i
)
+ F−i (si) · Vi (si, yi) +
∫
si
∞
Vi
(
s−i, y∗−i (s−i)
)
dF−i. (2)
Proposer i’s utility from making the best proposal with score si is Π¯
∗
i (si, y
∗
i (si) ;F ), which
we henceforth denote Π¯∗i (si;F ).
Fourth and finally, we establish that equilibrium score CDFs must satisfy the following
natural properties arising from the all pay component of the contest.
Lemma 4. The support of the equilibrium score CDFs over R+ is common, convex, and
includes 0.
Proof: We first argue sˆ > 0 in support of Fi → F−i (s) < F−i (sˆ) ∀s < sˆ. Suppose not;
so ∃s < sˆ where −i has no atom and F−i (s) = F−i (sˆ). Then Π¯i (sˆ, yi;F ) − Π¯i (s, yi;F ) =
− (αi − F−i (sˆ)) ·(sˆ−s) < 0, implying i’s best score-s proposal is strictly better than her best
score-sˆ proposal, a contradiction. We now argue this yields the desired properties. First,
an sˆ > 0 in i’s support but not −i implies ∃ δ > 0 s.t. F−i (s− δ) = F−i (s). Next, if the
common support were not convex or did not include 0, then there would ∃ sˆ > 0 in the
common support s.t. neither proposer has support immediately below, so Fi (s) < Fi (sˆ) ∀i,
s < sˆ would imply both proposers have atoms at sˆ, a contradiction. QED
We conclude by combining the preceding lemmas to state a preliminary characterization
of all equilibria in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Proposition 1. Necessary conditions for SPNE are as follows:
1. (Ideological Optimality) With probability 1, proposals are either
(a) negative score si ≤ 0 and 0-quality (si + y2i = 0)
(b) positive score si > 0 with ideology yi = y
∗
i (si) =
(
xi
αi
)
F−i (si) .
2. (Score Optimality) The profile of score CDFs (Fi, F−i) satisfy the following boundary
conditions and differential equations.
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• (Boundary Conditions) Fk (0) > 0 for at most one proposer k, and there
∃s¯ > 0 such that lim
s→s¯
{Fi (s)} = 1 ∀i.
• (Differential Equations) For all i and s ∈ [0, s] ,
αi − F−i (s) = f−i (s) · 2xi
(
y∗i (s)− y∗−i (s)
)
The above and Fi (s) = 0 ∀i, s < 0 are sufficient for equilibrium.
Proof: Appendix
3.2 Preliminary Observations about Equilibria
Proposition 1 implies that all equilibria have a simple form. At least one proposer (henceforth
labelled −k) is always active – thus, competition not only strictly benefits the DM in expec-
tation, but with probability 1. The other proposer (henceforth labelled k) may also always be
active (Fk (0) = 0), or be inactive with strictly positive probability (Fk (0) > 0). Inactivity
may manifest as proposing the DM’s ideal point with no quality (0, 0), or as “position-taking”
with more distant 0-quality proposals that always lose (sk < 0 and sk + y
2
k = 0). However,
any equilibrium exhibiting the latter is payoff-equivalent to one exhibiting the former; we
thus focus on the former for comparative statics.4 When either proposer i is active, she mixes
smoothly over the ideologically-optimal proposals (s, y∗i (s)) =
(
s, xi
αi
F−i (s)
)
with scores in
a common mixing interval [0, s¯] according to the CDF Fi (s).
5
The differential equations characterizing the equilibrium score CDFs arise intuitively from
the proposers’ indifference condition over [0, s]. The left hand side is i′s net marginal cost
of making a higher-score proposal, given a fixed probability F−i (s) of winning the contest;
the proposer pays marginal cost αi > 1 for sure, but with probability F−i (s) her proposal is
chosen and she enjoys a marginal benefit of 1 (because she values quality). The right hand
side represents i′s marginal ideological benefit of increasing her score. Doing so increases by
f−i (s) the probability that her proposal wins, which changes the ideological outcome from
her opponent’s optimal ideology y∗−i (s) at score s to her own optimal ideology y
∗
i (s).
4Profiles with “position-taking” are equilibria if the position-taking does not invite a deviation by −k to
negative scores; whether this is the case depends on k’s score-CDF below 0 and the DM’s outside options
O. When (0, 0) ∈ O the necessary conditions are also sufficient.
5Technically, the proposition does not state that the support interval is also bounded (s¯ <∞), but this
is later shown indirectly through the analytical equilibrium derivation.
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An interesting property of equilibria (see also Hirsch and Shotts (2015)) is the positive
association between a proposal’s distance from the DM and its score, implied by y∗i (s) =(
xi
αi
)
F−i (s). That is, in equilibrium more distant proposals are not merely higher-quality
than closer ones – they are also strictly better for the DM, implying that their additional
quality overcompensates him for his ideological losses. Intuitively, a proposal giving the DM
greater utility will be paired with a more-extreme ideology because it has a higher chance of
being chosen, so the proposer is more willing to pay the sure costs of producing quality for
the uncertain benefits of ideological change.
Figure 2 depicts a typical equilibrium involving symmetrically located proposers (−xL =
xR) but a cost advantage for the right proposer (αR < αL). The top panel depicts proposers’
score CDFs. The right proposer is always active due to her cost advantage (FR (0) = 0),
whereas the left proposer is sometimes inactive (FL (0) > 0). The right proposer’s proposals
are better for the DM in a first-order stochastic sense; we later show this is a general property
of symmetric ideologies and asymmetric costs.
The bottom panel depicts the ideological locations and qualities of the equilibrium pro-
posals – that is, a parametric plot of
(
y∗i (s) , s+ (y
∗
i (s))
2) for s ∈ [0, s¯]. The support of i’s
ideological proposals extends out to xi
αi
, which is i’s optimal ideology to propose absent com-
petition. The right proposer exploits her cost advantage to make more ideologically-extreme
proposals at every score. Her proposals are also first-order stochastically more extreme. We
later show this is also a general feature of symmetric ideologies paired with asymmetric costs.
4 Activity, Strength, Dominance, and Ideology
We begin by deriving properties of equilibrium that do not require a complete characteriza-
tion of the equilibrium score CDFs (these are fully characterized in Section 5). To do so we
use the following simple result describing the equilibrium relationship between the proposers’
score CDFs.
Lemma 5. In any SPNE, i (F−i (s)) = −i (Fi (s)) ∀s ≥ 0, where
i (p) =
∫ 1
p
|xi|
αi − qdq = |xi| log
(
αi − p
αi − 1
)
Proof: Rearranging the differential equation in score optimality yields f−i(s)·|xi|
αi−F−i(s) =
fi(s)·|x−i|
α−i−Fi(s) ∀s ∈ [0, s¯] →
∫ s¯
s
f−i(s)·|xi|
αi−F−i(s)ds =
∫ s¯
s
fi(s)·|x−i|
α−i−Fi(s)ds ∀s ∈ [0, s¯]; a change of variables
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Score CDFs and Policies (xL = −xR, αL > αR)
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and the boundary condition Fi (s¯) = 1 yields
∫ s¯
s
f−i(s)·|xi|
αi−F−i(s)ds =
∫ 1
F−i(s)
|xi|
αi−qdq = i (F−i (s)).
The relationship holds trivially for s > s¯. QED
We refer to the property in Lemma 5 as the engagement equality. To see why, observe
that the decreasing function i (p) captures i’s relative willingness to deviate from a proposal
winning with probability p to one that wins for sure (since the marginal ideological benefit
of moving policy in her direction is |xi|, and the net marginal cost of increasing score on
a proposal winning the contest with probability q is αi − q). We call this function i’s
engagement at probability p. The engagement equality i (F−i (s)) = −i (Fi (s)) states that
at every score s ≥ 0 both proposers must be equally engaged given the resulting probabilities
of winning the contest, and therefore equally willing to deviate to the maximum score s¯. It
is easily verified that i (1) = 0 ∀i and i (p) is strictly increasing in |xi| and decreasing in αi
∀p ∈ [0, 1).
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Usefully, the engagement equality implies a simple functional relationship between the
players’ score CDFs that must hold in equilibrium regardless of their exact values. Letting
pi () = αi − (αi − 1) e

|xi|
denote the inverse of i (p) (which is decreasing in p, increasing in |xi|, and decreasing in αi)
equilibrium requires that Fi (s) = p−i (i (F−i (s))) ∀s ∈ [0, s¯].
4.1 Activity and Strength
We first use the engagement equality to derive the identity of the sometimes-inactive proposer
k and the probability Fk (0) that she is sometimes inactive, as well as perform comparative
statics on Fk (0).
Proposition 2. In equilibrium k ∈ arg min
i
{i (0)} and
Fk (0) = p−k (k (0)) = α−k − (α−k − 1)
(
αk
αk − 1
)∣∣∣∣ xkx−k ∣∣∣∣
.
The probability k is inactive Fk (0) is decreasing in her distance from the DM |xk| and
her opponent’s quality costs α−k, and increasing in her opponent’s distance from the DM
|x−k| and her own quality costs αk. In addition, lim|xk|→0 {Fk (0)} = lim|x−k|→∞ {Fk (0)} =
limαk→∞ {Fk (0)} = limα−k→1 {Fk (0)} = 1.
Proof: Suppose k (0) < −k (0); then Fk (0) = 0 and the engagement equality would
imply F−k (0) < 0, a contradiction. Since Fi (0) = 0 for some i we must have F−k (0) = 0
and Fk (0) = p−k (k (0)) > 0. Comparative statics and limit statements follow from previous
observations on i (·) and pi (·). QED
The sometimes-inactive proposer is thus the one with the lowest engagement at proba-
bility 0 – that is, who is least willing to participate in the contest entirely. Figure 3 is a
contour plot of the probability that the sometimes-inactive proposer enters the contest as a
function of the ideology xR and costs αR of the right proposer, holding parameters of the
left proposer fixed. In the purple region the right proposer is sometimes inactive; increases
in her ideological extremism |xR| or decreases in her costs αR promote greater parity in the
contest and an increase in the right proposer’s activity. In the blue region the left proposer
is sometimes inactive, and increases in the right proposer’s extremism or decreases in her
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costs promote imbalance and a decrease in the left proposer’s activity. Along the white curve
both proposers are always active.
The pattern of activity thus resembles two-player all pay contests without spillovers.
Observable competition is a function of parity in the motivations and abilities of the par-
ticipants. In addition, the probability one player stays out approaches 1 as the imbalance
between them becomes arbitrarily extreme (Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996); Hillman
and Riley (1989)). In the present contest, this occurs if the sometimes-inactive proposer’s
ideal xk approaches the DM’s (so she loses her ideological motive to participate in the con-
test), her marginal cost of producing quality αk becomes arbitrarily high, her opponent’s
ideal x−k moves arbitrarily far from the DM (so he becomes arbitrarily motivated), or her
opponent’s marginal cost of quality α−k approaches its intrinsic value of 1.
Figure 3: Effect of R’s Parameters on Probability of Direct Competition (xL = −1, αL = 2)
Figure 4: Effect of Right Entrepreneur’s Parameters on Probability 
of Direct Competition (xL = -1, αL = 2)
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We next use the engagement equality to derive the players’ probabilities of victory.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium the probability proposer k loses the contest is
∫ 1
0
p−k (k (p)) dp =
∫ 1
0
α−k − (α−k − 1)(αk − p
αk − 1
)∣∣∣∣ xkx−k ∣∣∣∣ dp
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which is decreasing in her distance from the DM |xk| and her opponent’s quality costs α−k,
and increasing in her opponent’s distance from the DM |x−k| and her own quality costs αk.
Proof: The probability k loses the contest is
∫ s¯
0
f−k (s)Fk (s) ds; applying the engage-
ment equality this is
∫ s¯
0
p−k (k (F−k (s))) f−k (s) ds, and applying a change of variables of
F−k (s) for p (recalling F−k(0) = 0) yields the result. QED
The probability k loses thus obeys the same comparative statics as her probability of in-
activity. Somewhat paradoxically, she becomes less likely to win when her preferences are
closer to the DM or her opponent’s are more distant. More intuitively, she becomes more
likely to win if she is more able or her opponent less able.
4.2 Dominance
In the standard two-player all-pay contest with asymmetries in valuations and costs, there is
always an unambiguously weaker player, who makes bids that are first-order stochastically
worse for the DM (and by implication less likely to win). In the present contest, in contrast,
there may be no unambiguously weaker player in this sense.
Proposition 4. Proposer i is dominated (F−i (s) < Fi (s) ∀s ∈ (0, s¯)) i.f.f. she is less
engaged at every probability p (i (p) < −i (p) ∀p ∈ (0, 1)). Equivalently, she is dominated
i.f.f. both
∫ 1
0
|xi|
αi−qdq ≤
∫ 1
0
|x−i|
α−i−qdq and
|xi|
αi−1 ≤
|x−i|
α−i−1 , where the latter condition is stronger
than the former i.f.f. i has a cost advantage.
Proof: Appendix
Clearly, a proposer k who is both less extreme (|xk| ≤ |x−k|) and less able (αk ≥ α−k)
(with one strict) satisfies both conditions and is therefore dominated. This implies that
a proposer who is more ideologically distant from the DM actually dominates the contest
(provided she is no less able).
However, when one proposer is more extreme while the other is more able, then lower
engagement at probability 0 is necessary but not sufficient for the more able proposer to be
dominated. The reason is that the proposers intrinsically value their quality investments.
This causes the effective marginal cost quality to decrease for higher score proposals, since
such proposals are more likely to chosen, and their quality more likely to be enjoyed. Conse-
quently, if proposer k is sometimes inactive despite a cost advantage (because her opponent
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−k is much more extreme), then although she may be less willing to invest in quality on
average, she may still be more willing to invest in quality on higher-score proposals.
To see this concretely, consider two proposers (L,R) who are equally engaged at probabil-
ity 0 (L (0) = R (0)) because L is a less able “extremist” while R is a more able “moderate”
(|xL| > |xR| and αL > αR). The two panels of Figure 4 depict such an equilibrium. The
moderate strictly dominates the contest and is strictly more likely to win even though the
proposers both always participate. If the example is then perturbed to make R slightly less
able, then she will sometimes be inactive (and is therefore no longer dominant), but remains
strictly more likely to win the contest (by continuity) and is not dominated either.
Figure 4: Equilibrium with Equal Engagement (xR < −xL, αL > αR)
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 xD=0
s
L
Lx
α
Figure 5: Equilibrium Score CDFs, Equal Engagement
Left proposer’s FL(s)
Right proposer’s FR(s)	
s
R
Rx
α
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
IdeologyxR xL
Quality
 xD=0
s
L
Lx
α
Figure 5: Equilibrium Score CDFs, Equal Engagement
Left proposer’s FL(s)
Right proposer’s FR(s)	
s
R
Rx
α
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
16
4.3 Ideology
Lastly, the engagement equality directly yields simple expressions for the probability distri-
bution over the ideology of each player’s proposals.
Proposition 5. Let Gi (y) = Pr (|yi| ≤ |y|) denote the probability that i’s proposal is closer
to the DM than y. Then
Gi (y) = p−i
(
i
(
y
xi/αi
))
= α−i − (α−i − 1)
(
xi − y
xi − xi/αi
)∣∣∣ xix−i ∣∣∣
,
which is first-order stochastically increasing in i’s distance from the DM |xi|, decreasing in
her costs αi, decreasing in her opponent’s distance from the DM |x−i|, and increasing in her
opponent’s costs αi.
Proof: Proposer i’s ideology at score s is y∗i (s) =
xi
αi
F−i (s) (from ideological optimality),
so F−i (s∗i (y)) =
y
xi/αi
where s∗i (y) is the inverse of y
∗
i (s). That is, the probability −i makes
a proposal with score ≤ s∗i (y) is yxi/αi . Now the probability G(y) that i makes a proposal
closer to the DM than y is Fi (s
∗
i (y)), which is = p−i (i (F−i (s
∗
i (y)))) = p−i
(
i
(
y
xi/αi
))
from the engagement equality. Comparative statics are straightforward. QED
Thus, when a proposer i becomes more ideologically extreme (higher |xi|) or able (lower αi),
she reacts by making first-order stochasically more extreme proposals. In the former case
she is more motivated to exploit quality to realize ideological gains, and in the latter case she
is better able to do so. Combined with the previous results, this means that a more extreme
(but no less able) proposer or a more able (but no more extreme) proposer maintains her
dominance in the contest despite the greater ideological extremism of her proposals.
How does proposer i’s opponent −i react to i becoming more extreme or more able?
By moderating the ideological extremism of her own proposals (first-order stochasically) to
improve her chances of winning the contest. A more extreme or able i endogenously increases
the ideological stakes of the contest with her more-extreme proposals, thereby increasing the
importance of victory to −i and the value of moderating her proposal in order to win.
5 Payoffs
We complete the analysis by calculating payoffs. This requires first characterizing score
CDFs Fi (s) satisfying Proposition 1, which are shown constructively to be unique.
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Proposition 6. The unique score CDFs over s ≥ 0 satisfying Proposition 1 are Fi (s) =
p−i ( (s)) ∀i, where  (s) is the inverse of
s () = 2
∫ k(0)

∑
j
|xj|
αj
pj (ˆ) dˆ.
The inverse score CDFs are si (Fi) = s (−i (Fi)) ∀i. The function s () is strictly increasing
in xi and strictly decreasing in αi ∀ ∈ [0, k (0)), and the maximum score is s¯ = s (0).
Proof: From the engagement equality i (F−i (s)) =
∫ 1
F−i(s)
|xi|
αi−qdq =  (s) ∀i, s for
some (s). We characterize the unique  (s) implying score CDFs Fi (s) = p−i ( (s)) and
optimal ideologies yi (s) =
xi
αi
pi ( (s)) that satisfy score optimality. First observe that
′ (s) = fi (s) ′−i (Fi (s)) = − f−i(s)|xi|αi−F−i(s) . Next the differential equations may be rewritten as
αi−F−i(s)
f−i(s)·|xi| = 2
∑
j yj (s). Substituting the preceding observations into both sides yields
1
′(s) =
−2∑j xjαj pj ( (s)), and rewriting in terms of the inverse s () yields s′ () = −2∑j |xj |αj pj ().
Lastly k (F−k (s)) =  (s) and F−k (0) = 0 imply the boundary condition s (k (0)) = 0 so
s () =
∫ k(0)

−s′ (ˆ) dˆ = 2 ∫ k(0)

∑
j
|xj |
αj
pj (ˆ) dˆ. Now s () is straightforwardly increasing in
|xi| and decreasing in αi given previous observations about pj (ˆ). QED
An interesting implication of the equilibrium characterization is that the maximum score
s¯ changes continuously with the parameters of both proposers, even when one is dominant.
This contrasts with the standard 2-player all pay contest, where the mixing interval is unaf-
fected by the parameters of the stronger player.
The preceding characterization transparently yields the following comparative statics.
Corollary 1. Increasing a proposer’s extremism |xi| or decreasing her costs αi first-order
stochastically increases her own score CDF, but has ambiguous effects on her opponent’s
score CDF.
To see that the effect of a proposer’s parameters on her opponent’s score CDF is necessarily
ambiguous, suppose that the always-active proposer −k becomes even more extreme or able.
Then her opponent k becomes less likely to be active, but also the range of scores [0, s¯] over
which she mixes when she is active increases. She thus has a higher probability of making
very high-score proposals, even while she is simultaneously less likely to enter the contest.
5.1 Proposer Payoffs
Using Proposition 6, the proposers’ equilibrium payoffs are as follows.
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Proposition 7. Proposer i’s equilibrium utility is Π∗i (s¯;F
∗) = −
(
1− 1
αi
)
x2i − (αi − 1) s¯,
which is decreasing in her own costs αi as well as either players’ extremism |xj| ∀j, and
increasing in her opponent’s costs α−i.
Proof: Appendix
A proposer’s equilibrium utility has two components. The first −
(
1− 1
αi
)
x2i is her
utility if she could make proposals as a “monopolist” (and the DM’s outside option included
(0, 0)). The second − (αi − 1) s¯ is the cost generated by competition, which forces her to
make proposals that leave the DM strictly better off than the best “free” proposal (0, 0)
in order to maintain influence. This competition cost is increasing in i’s marginal cost αi
of generating quality (holding s¯ fixed) as well as the maximum score s¯, which in turn is
increasing in both proposers’ ideological extremism and decreasing in their costs everywhere
in the parameter space.
A proposer is thus strictly harmed when her competitor becomes more extreme. She
is also harmed when her competitor becomes more able, despite the fact that ability is
channeled into common value investments. In the model these investments are exploited to
gain ideological influence. Both effects are distinct from all pay contests without spillovers
(Siegel (2009)), where the equilibrium utility of the “sometimes inactive” player is pinned at
her fixed value for losing, and is unaffected by changes in her opponent’s parameters unless
they influence who is more active.
A proposer also worse off when her own preference become more distant from the decision-
maker. This occurs two reasons; (1) it becomes more expensive to make equally-competitive
proposals that are the same distance from her own ideal, and (2) the intensity of competition
increases. Finally, a proposer is worse off when her costs of producing quality increase – even
though there is a countervailing effect of reducing the intensity of competition (and indeed,
the competition cost (αi − 1)s¯ alone is not generically monotonic in αi).
5.2 DM Payoffs
Lastly, again using Proposition 6 the DM’s equilibrium utility and the proposers’ average
scores (which bound the DM’s utility from below) are as follows.
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Proposition 8. The DM’s equilibrium utility is U∗DM =
∫ 0
k(0)
s () · ∂
∂
(∏
j
pj ()
)
d =
2
∫ k(0)
0
(
1−
∏
j
pj ()
)
·
(∑
j
|xj|
αj
pj ()
)
d
Proposer i’s average score is E [si] =
∫ 0
k(0)
s () · ∂
∂
(p−i ()) d =
2
∫ k(0)
0
(1− p−i ()) ·
(∑
j
|xj|
αj
pj ()
)
d
Proof: Fi (s)F−i (s) is the CDF of max{si, s−i} so the DM’s utility is
∫ s¯
0
s· ∂
∂s
(∏
j
Fj (s)
)
ds =
∫ s¯
0
s · ∂
∂s
(∏
j
pj ( (s))
)
ds. A change of variables from s to  yields the first expression and
integration by parts and rearranging yields the second. A nearly identical series of steps
yields i’s average score. QED
Direct comparative statics on the DM’s utility U∗DM are not straightforward because
changing a proposer’s parameters has mixed effects on her opponent’s score CDF. However,
the fact that unilaterally greater extremism and ability always strictly increases the max-
imum score s¯ suggests that imbalance between the participants may be beneficial to the
DM if it results from one proposer’s greater motivation or ability. This is quite different
from the standard complete-information all pay contest, where imbalance reduces the par-
ticipation of the weaker player and makes the DM worse off ((Baye, Kovenock and de Vries
(1996); Hillman and Riley (1989))). The following local comparative statics result verifies
this intuition.
Proposition 9. When the proposers are symmetric (|xi| = |x−i| and αi = α−i), the DM’s
utility is locally increasing eithers’ extremism or ability.
Proof: Appendix
The DM thus strictly benefits locally if symmetry between the players is broken by one
becoming more extreme or able – even though the other also becomes less active.
Lastly, the effect of asymmetry on the DM’s utility may be examined globally by consid-
ering his utility in the limit as the contest becomes very imbalanced.
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Proposition 10. The DM’s utility exhibits the following limiting behavior
0 = lim
αi→∞
U∗DM = lim
xi→0
U∗DM < lim
αi→1
U∗DM < lim
xi→∞
U∗DM =∞
Proof: Observe that E [s−k] ≤ U∗DM ≤ s¯. For the first two limiting statements it is easily
verified that s¯ → 0 as αk → ∞ or xk → 0. For the third limiting statement it is easily
verified that limα−k→1E [s−k] and limα−k→1 s¯ are strictly positive and finite. For the fourth
limiting statement observe that E [s−k] ≥ |x−k|α−k p−k (k (0)) ·2
∫ k(0)
0
(1− pk ()) d which→∞
as |x−k| → ∞ since the first term →∞ and the remaining terms are non-decreasing. QED
If an extreme imbalance is the result of one proposer’s incompetence or ideological mod-
eration, the DM’s utility approaches 0, her utility if −i were a “monopolist” (and the DM’s
outside options included (0, 0)). (Proposer −i’s utility also approaches her utility if she were
a monopolist). The DM thus never benefits from having one proposer be an ideological
“ally” vs. someone more extreme – an ally is unmotivated to invest in quality because her
ideological interests are already represented by the DM (see also Hirsch and Shotts (2015)).
However, if extreme imbalance is the result of one proposer’s greater ability to produce
quality (specifically, if her marginal cost of producing quality approaches its intrinsic value),
then the DM’s utility is bounded away from 0. In this case the DM strictly benefits from the
potential for competition, even though actual competition is almost never observed (since
F−i (0) = Fk (0) approaches 1).
Finally and most strikingly, unilateral ideological extremism benefits the decisionmaker
in a strong sense; the DM can achieve arbitrarily high utility with a proposer whose prefer-
ences are sufficiently distant from her own. As one proposer becomes increasingly unilaterally
extreme, her proposals also become increasingly extreme, but the DM becomes increasingly
better off due to the proposals’ greater quality. At the same time, the extremist’s oppo-
nent becomes increasingly unlikely to enter the contest, moderate in her proposals, and
(unboundedly) worse off.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper considers a contest among ideologically-motivated players. Two proposers have
differing ideological objectives from a decisionmaker and each other. They may make costly
up-front investments to increase the value of their proposals to all players, termed quality
(valence in the political science literature), and may have differential ability at doing so. In
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the resulting equilibrium, the proposers exploit a mixture of quality investments and ideolog-
ical concessions to gain the support of the decisionmaker. The model is a generalization of
Hirsch and Shotts (2015) that allows for asymmetric proposers, differential weight between
quality and ideology, and different potential outside options for the decisionmaker (including
no outside option as in a two-candidate election).
Applications of the model in political science and political economy are widespread and
include elections, lawmaking, lobbying, bureaucratic policy implementation, and judicial
opinion writing. More generally, the model may be applied to organizational choice when
there are a mixture of competing and common interests, freedom among several individuals
or groups to make proposals, and a unitary decisionmaker lacking the ability to write ex-ante
contracts and facing a deadline.
Although the model is exceedingly simple to formulate, it results in a contest with com-
plexities that are difficult to analyze jointly. It is complete information, multidimensional,
and asymmetric. Strategies have both “all-pay” and “winner-pay” components. Most im-
portantly, it features a “second-order rank over spillover” – the strategy of the (first ranked)
winner exerts a direct effect on the utility of the (second ranked) loser, because she must live
under the winner’s policy. We show that the game yields a unique equilibrium in continuous
mixed strategies with an elegant analytical characterization. The solution methods employed
can be used to solve similar models in which players compete to have their preferred ideo-
logical policies enacted by exerting costly up-front effort (for example, if effort represented
campaign advertising in an election that only influenced the voters).6
Result from the model are counterintuitive, and key themes are two-fold: (i) unilaterally
greater extremism benefits the DM because the resulting motivation is partially channelled
into productive investment; even though the resulting policies are also more extreme as
a byproduct, and the other proposer is harmed; (ii) greater ability at common-value in-
vestments has similar equilibrium effects to greater ideological extremism, because such
investments are exploited for ideological gains.
Formal results are numerous and spread throughout the paper; we provide a self-contained
review here. Unless otherwise noted, comparative statics statements are in a first-order
stochastic sense. First, the (essentially) unique equilibrium is in continuous mixed strategies;
each proposer mixes over a curve of proposals with different ideologies and qualities. Second,
in equilibrium more ideologically-extreme proposals in the support are strictly better for the
6Solving similar models computationally is straightforward; analytic solutions are elusive in the asym-
metric case.
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DM than more moderate ones. Third, one proposer is always active in the sense of making
a positive-quality proposal – she is the one with the highest value of
∫ 1
0
|xi|
αi−qdq. Fourth, a
proposer is dominant in the sense of making first-order stochastically better proposals for
the DM i.f.f. she has the higher value of both
∫ 1
0
|xi|
αi−qdq and
|xi|
αi−1 . Fifth, comparative statics
are as follows.
Comparative Statics. Increasing proposer i’s extremism |xi|:
• either increases her own probability of being active (if she is sometimes-inactive), or
decreases her opponent’s probability of being active
• increases her probability of winning
• maintains her dominance if she was already dominant
• makes her proposals more extreme but also better for the DM
• makes her opponent’s proposals more moderate, and neither better nor worse unam-
biguously for the DM
• decreases both her own and her opponent’s utility
Decreasing proposer i’s costs αi yields all the same aforementioned effects, except that it
increases rather than decreases proposer i’s utility
Sixth, the DM benefits locally when symmetry between the proposers is broken because
one becomes unilaterally more extreme or able. Lastly, if a proposer becomes arbitrarily
extreme or able, the probability of observing direct competition approaches zero, but the
DM’s utility is bounded away from what it would be absent competition. In fact, as one
proposer becomes unboundedly extreme the DM’s utility becomes unboundedly large.
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future work. One is to expand the number of
possible participants in the contest. This is natural in settings where proposals are made
by individuals rather than teams, or when proposals may come from varied sources (e.g.,
interest groups as well as legislators developing potential legislation). It is straightforward
to show that when costs are common, there always exists an equilibrium in which the two
most ideologically-extreme potential proposers play their equilibrium strategies in the present
model, while the other potential proposers are inactive. (Hirsch and Shotts (2015) contains
the weaker result for the symmetric model).
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A second is to allow the proposers to also gain the decisionmaker’s support using targeted
benefits (pork, as in vote buying models) in addition to collective benefits (as in our model),
and analyze when they use targeted vs. common benefits.
A third is to study institutional design (again without the ability to write ex-ante con-
tracts). Primitives of the model potentially under control of an institutional designer include
the marginal costs of generating quality (using subsidies), the ideology of the proposers (by
choosing organizational membership), the ideology of the decisionmaker (through an ap-
pointment or collective choice procedure), and other constrained aspects of the “scoring
rule” (e.g. providing a “head start” to one proposer).
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(Score Optimality) A score sˆ > 0 in the common support implies [0, sˆ] in the com-
mon support (by Lemma 4) implying lims→sˆ−
{
Π¯i (s;F )
} ≥ U∗i . Equilibrium also requires
Π¯i (s;F ) ≤ U∗i ∀s so Π¯i (s;F ) = U∗i ∀s ∈ [0, s¯], further implying the F ’s are absolutely
continuous over (0,∞) (given our initial assumptions), and therefore ∂
∂s
(Π∗i (s;F )) = 0 for
almost all s ∈ [0, s¯]. This straightforwardly yields the differential equations for score op-
timality, with the boundary conditions implied by Lemma 4. (Ideological Optimality) At
most one proposer (k) makes ≤ 0-score proposals with positive probability, so F−k (0) = 0.
Such proposals lose for sure and never influence a tie, and therefore must be 0-quality with
probability 1, yielding property (a). Atomless score CDFs ∀s > 0 implies (s, y∗i (s)) is the
strictly best score-s proposal (by Lemma 1), yielding property (b). (Sufficiency) Necessary
conditions imply all (s, y∗i (s)) with s ∈ (0, s¯] yield a constant U∗i . F−k (0) = 0 implies k’s
strictly best score−0 proposal is (0, y∗k (0)) = (0, 0) and yields Π¯k (0;F ), and Fk (s) = 0 for
s < 0 implies k has a size Fk (0) atom here. Thus both proposers’ mixed strategies yield
U∗i , and neither can profitably deviate to s ∈ (0, s¯]. To see neither can profitably deviate
to s > s¯, observe Π∗i (s;F ) − Π∗i (s¯;F ) = − (αi − 1) (s− s¯) < 0. To see k cannot profitably
deviate to sk ≤ 0, F−k (0) = 0 implies such proposals lose and never influence a tie, and
so yield utility ≤ U∗k . To see −k cannot profitably deviate to s−k ≤ 0, observe all such
proposals result in either (0, y−k) or (0, 0) when sk ≤ 0 (since the DM’s other choices are
(0, 0) and O), and thus yield utility ≤ max{Π¯−k (0, 0;F ) , Π¯−k (0, y−k;F )} which is ≤ U∗−k.
QED
Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 5 and the engagement function i (p) strictly decreasing when p ∈ [0, 1) im-
mediately implies sign (−k (F−k (s))− k (F−k (s))) = sign (Fk (s)− F−k (s)) ∀s ∈ [0, s¯),
which straightforwardly yields the first statement. Now let δ (p) = −k (p) − k (p) , so
δ (0) ≥ 0 = δ (1). We argue δ′ (1) ≤ 0 is necessary and sufficient. For necessity, δ′ (1) >
0 = δ (1) → δ (p) < 0 in a neighborhood below 1. For sufficiency, it is easily veri-
fied that δ′ (p) = |xk|
αk−p −
|x−k|
α−k−p crosses 0 at most once when the proposers are asym-
metric; thus δ (0) ≥ 0 = δ (1) ≥ δ′ (0) implies δ (p) strictly quasi-concave over [0, 1] and
δ (p) > min {δ (0) , δ (1)} ≥ 0 for p ∈ (0, 1).
We last argue δ (0) ≥ 0 and αk > α−k → δ′ (1) < 0. Observe that αk < αk and
δ′ (0) = xk
αk
− x−k
α−k
≤ 0 → δ′ (1) = |xk|
αk
(
1
1−1/αk
)
− |x−k|
α−k
(
1
1−1/α−k
)
< 0. If δ′ (0) ≤ 0 we are
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done; if δ′ (0) > 0 then δ′ (1) ≥ 0→ δ′ (p) > 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1)→ δ (1) > 0, a contradiction. QED
Proof of Proposition 7
A proposer’s equilibrium utility is straightforward since (s¯, y∗i (s¯)) is in the support of their
strategy and wins for sure. Comparative statics of a proposer’s i’s parameters on her oppo-
nent −i’s utility, as well as of xi on her own utility, follow immediately from previously-shown
statics on s¯ = s (). Taking the derivative with respect to αi, substituting in
∂
∂αi
(
pi()
αi
)
=
xip
′
i()
(αi−1)α2i
, ∂k(0)
∂αk
= − |xk|
αk(αk−1) , −
p′i()xi
αi−pi() = 1, performing a change of variables, and rearrang-
ing the expression yields −1i=k · 2
∫ k(0)
0
|x−k|
α−k
(
p−k ()−
(
αk log
(
αk
αk−1
))−1
p−k (k (0))
)
d
−
(
|xi|
αi
)2 (
1 + 2
∫ 1
pi(k(0))
(
αip
αi−p − 1
))
dp. The first term is negative since p−k () > p−k (k (0))
for  < k (0) and
1
αk
<
∫ 1
0
1
αk−pdp = log
(
αk
αk−1
)
. The second term is also negative since
1 + 2
∫ 1
pi(k(0))
(
αip
αi−p − 1
)
> (1− pi (k (0))) + 2
∫ 1
pi(k(0))
(
αip
αi
− 1
)
=
∫ 1
pi(k(0))
(2p− 1) dp ≥ 0.
QED
Proof of Proposition 9
First differentiating the DM’s utility U∗DM with respect to |x−k| and applying symme-
try yields 2
α
∫ (0)
0
((
1− 3 (p ())2) · x∂p()
∂x
+
(
1− (p ())2) p ()) d which is transparently ≥
2 x
α
∫ (0)
0
(
1− 3 (p ())2) ∂p()
∂x
d. Now substituting ∂p()
∂x
= − log
(
α−p()
α−1
)
p′ () and a change
of variables yields 2 x
α
∫ 1
0
(1− 3p2) log (α−p
α−1
)
dp = 2 x
α
∫ 1
0
(
p−p3
α−p
)
dp > 0. Next differentiating
U∗DM w.r.t. α−k and applying symmetry yields 2x
∫ (0)
0
((
1− (p ())2) ∂
∂α
(
p()
α
)
− 2
α
(p ())2 ∂p()
∂α
)
d.
Substituting ∂
∂α
(
p()
α
)
= x
(α−1)α2p
′ (), ∂p()
∂α
= −
(
1−p()
α−1
)
, − p′()x
α−p() = 1, rearranging, and a
change of variables yields 2x
2
(α−1)α2
∫ 1
0
(
2p2
(
α−αp
α−p
)
− (1− p2)
)
dp < 0. QED
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